The SEC should require crowdfunding issuers under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act to obtain private insurance against liability based on Section 4A(c) of the Securities Act, using a model of Directors & Officers' liability insurance. Antifraud concerns could be a major reason for SEC holdup on crowdfunding rulemaking because the SEC must balance investor protection against the costs of disclosure. To address these concerns, a private insurance model could spread the costs of fraud in crowdfunding across the issuers by using the market to determine the "present value of shareholder litigation risk" for that issuer. The maximum recovery would be capped by the amount of the crowdfunding offering, and any recovery under the proposed insurance plan would require proof of a cause of action under Section 4A(c).
Introduction
On August 3, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") announced twenty-six enforcement actions against eighty-two defendants for defrauding investors out of more than $12 million.
1 These enforcement actions were only a few out of multiple enforcement actions against "fraudulent secondary transactions in the over-the-counter markets of 'microcap'
companies" throughout the late 1990s. 2 Microcap companies are typically "thinly capitalized"
companies that do not file periodic reports with the SEC. 3 Many of the enforcement actions involved "freely tradable securities issued in Rule 504 offerings." 4 Rule 504 5 is a rule that the SEC promulgated in 1982 as a "limited offering exemption designed to aid small businesses raising 'seed capital,'" 6 in response to a mandate from Congress to expand access to capital for small businesses under the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 ("SBIIA"). 7 Rule 504 caps the maximum aggregate offering price to $1 million over any 12-month period. 8 One problem with Rule 504, however, was that it allowed a nonreporting issuer 9 to engage in general solicitation and advertising. Under Rule 504, a nonreporting issuer could "offer and sell securities to an unlimited number of persons without regard to their sophistication or experience and without delivery of any specified information." 10 This ability allowed broker- (1980) . 8 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (exemption for limited offerings and sales of securities not exceeding $1,000,000). 9 A nonreporting issuer is an issuer who does not file periodic reports with the SEC disclosing the company's financial condition under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006) . 10 Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, The "Seed Capital" Exemption, supra note 2. dealers 11 to engage in fraudulent pump-and-dump schemes "to sell the securities at everincreasing prices to unknowing investors." 12 In response to these schemes, the SEC "modif [ied] Rule 504 to limit the circumstances where general solicitation [was] permitted." 13 Rule 504 securities can now only be sold to accredited investors, unless the securities are registered under state law with a public filing and a disclosure document. 14 The limits thus scaled back the ability of broker-dealers to engage in general solicitation and advertising to unsophisticated investors.
Thirteen years later, in 2012, Congress again directed the SEC to expand access to capital for small businesses through the Jumpstart Our Business Startups ("Jobs") Act, 15 which created a new crowdfunding exemption for small businesses to raise up to $1 million. According to Professor Thomas Hazen, the Jobs Act revisits the same issues that the SEC faced following the SBIIA, including balancing access to capital for small businesses against disclosures necessary to protect unsophisticated investors. 16 Professor Hazen argues that securities class action attorneys lack the incentive to file suit because the maximum loss to investors is $1 million.
17
Professor Alan Palmiter further argues that SEC enforcement can cover only the most "egregious cases" of fraud because of limited agency resources. 18 Professor Palmiter suggests that a private insurance model could be a solution to these issues, but does not explain how it would work. across the issuers. 20 The Essay proceeds in three parts: Part I introduces crowdfunding, Part II proposes private antifraud insurance and discusses the SEC's authority to require the insurance, and Part III applies Directors and Officers' liability insurance to the crowdfunding context.
I. Crowdfunding Defined by the Jobs Act
The Jobs Act defines the basic parameters of the new crowdfunding exemption within Section 4(a)(6) and Section 4A of the Securities Act. 21 The maximum offering price that the issuer can raise over any twelve-month period is $1 million, and issuers must provide audited financial statements for any offerings of more than $500,000 over any twelve-month period.
22
The exemption also limits the funds that can be raised from each investor. 23 For any investor with an annual income or net worth below $100,000, the issuer cannot sell securities exceeding the greater of $2000 or 5% of the investor's annual income or net worth. 24 For any investor with an annual income or net worth at or above $100,000, the issuer cannot sell securities exceeding the lesser of $100,000 or 10% of the investor's annual income or net worth. 25 This Part first discusses the required disclosures under the crowdfunding exemption before discussing the elements of liability under the exemption and the problems with litigation-based enforcement.
A. Required Disclosures under the Crowdfunding Exemption
Crowdfunding issuers are required to provide investors with specific disclosures that must be filed with the SEC. 26 The disclosures include the purpose and price of the offering, the target amount, and the deadline for reaching the target amount; information about the company, 20 The proposed insurance would not meet the Howey test because there is no expectation of profits. See S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946) . The insurance could still be a security, however, because Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act defines a security to include a "guarantee of" a security. Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate a bad act, defined in Section 4A(c) as any material misrepresentation or omission "by means of any written or oral communication" in connection with the offering. 48 Although the bad act seems to match that in Section 12(a)(2), the definition differs from Section 12(a)(2) because the latter limits liability for any written communications to those contained within prospectuses. 49 The Securities Act defines prospectuses to include any written or broadcast offer or confirmation of sale. 50 The definition of prospectuses, however, expressly excludes certain written communications, such as bare bones announcements. 51 Thus, Section 4A(c) could cover more forms of written communication than Section 12(a)(2) covers.
52 42 Palmiter, supra note 18, at 405. 43 Id. 44 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(2), with 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). 45 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(3). Ambiguity exists concerning whether the term "issuer" includes all officers or only principal executive officers, but that is beyond the scope of this Essay. See Palmiter, supra note 18, at 407. 46 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(5) (providing that funding portals may need to conduct a "background and securities enforcement regulatory history check on each officer, director and person holding more than 20 percent of the outstanding equity of every issuer" to "reduce the risk of fraud" with respect to crowdfunding transactions). 47 Compare id. § 77d-1(c)(2), with 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2 requires scienter, i.e., the intent to deceive or a highly reckless disregard for the truth, 67 plaintiffs may prefer to file suit under Section 4A(c), which does not require scienter.
68

C. Problems with Traditional Enforcement via Private Securities Litigation
One problem with traditional enforcement through private securities litigation is that litigation does not work well without strong economic incentives. 69 Professor Thomas Hazen highlights the need for investor protection against crowdfunding fraud while underscoring the inadequacy of traditional remedies of securities litigation in addressing crowdfunding liability. 70 Even if the SEC requires the disclosure of a prospectus to investors in a crowdfunding offering, the $1 million in available damages for a material misrepresentation or omission does not justify the economics of filing suit for damages based on the traditional contingency fee model. 71 In securities class actions against public reporting issuers, for example, settlements for class actions with estimated damages of less than $50 million were 10.5% of damages or about Yet Professor Hazen only proposes increased disclosures to prevent fraud before it occurs; he does not suggest a solution to compensate investors for losses after an issuer makes a material misrepresentation or omission. Instead of proposing increased disclosures, this Essay proposes private insurance as a mechanism to cover losses to crowdfunding investors after the occurrence of a material misrepresentation or omission. Particularly for issuers with no assets, insurance could make it more feasible for plaintiffs to sue issuers for a $1 million recovery. 72 Palmiter, supra note 18, at 417. 73 Id. at 418. 74 See id. at 417-18. 75 For an analysis of the SEC's authority to reduce the risk of fraud under Section 4A, see infra Part II.B. 76 Hazen, supra note 16, at 1765. 77 Id. 78 Id. at 1765-66. 79 Id. at 1767.
II. Proposed Private Insurance Model to Reduce the Impact of Fraud in Crowdfunding
The SEC should adopt a private insurance model to reduce the impact of fraud in crowdfunding. Because the maximum recovery under Section 4A(c) is $1 million, securities class action attorneys lack the incentive to file suit. 80 Because of limited agency resources at the SEC, enforcement actions by the SEC would cover only the most "egregious cases." 81 This Part first discusses private insurance as a model to spread the costs of fraud in crowdfunding across the issuers and second addresses the SEC's authority to require the issuers to obtain insurance.
A. Antifraud Insurance Against Material Misrepresentations or Omissions
A private insurance model could help reduce the effects of crowdfunding fraud because the insurance would recoup investor losses from the fraud. Professor Alan Palmiter analogizes crowdfunding to a financial transaction in which the "effects of a failed product/service are relatively small, compared to the costs of accountability-whether through public enforcement, private litigation, or arbitration." 82 Professor Palmiter suggests a solution of private insurance.
83
Because the cost of insurance would be borne by investors, an insurance-based system could avoid the costs of litigation-based enforcement. 84 The insurance company would be a "natural gatekeeper" that could identify possible fraudulent offerings before issuance to the public.
85
Professor Palmiter further suggests that insurance companies could evaluate whether an issuer's disclosure and pricing to investors would be adequate to ensure success, but he does not define success, underscoring the inherent difficulty in evaluating the "success" of any equity In sum, the role of the proposed insurance should not be to cover all losses, but only those due to a material misrepresentation or omission. An insurance scheme covering all failed crowdfunding offerings would be very expensive, if not exceed the entire price of the offering itself. Even underwriters in registered public offerings are not held liable unless the plaintiffs can prove a material misrepresentation or omission related to the offering materials. 93 Therefore, Professor Palmiter's suggestion that the insurance could perform an underwriting function may not be correct; the insurance should only cover material misrepresentations or omissions.
B. SEC Authority to Require Antifraud Insurance
Although the Jobs Act does not provide express authority for the SEC to require issuers to obtain insurance, the SEC may have implied authority to require insurance under Section 4A of the Securities Act. 94 Section 4A separates the requirements for registered funding portals from those for crowdfunding issuers. 95 Regarding the registered funding portals, Section 4A(a)(5) provides the SEC with the express authority to "take such measures to reduce the risk of fraud with respect to such transactions." 96 Section 4A(a)(5) therefore provides the SEC with an express mandate to reduce the risk of fraud in regulating the funding portals.
Congress further provides guidance on appropriate measures that the SEC may impose on the registered funding portals. These measures could include "a background and securities enforcement regulatory history check on each officer, director, and person holding more than 20 percent of the outstanding equity of every issuer." 97 Section 4A(a)(12) also expressly provides a catchall provision that the SEC may impose other requirements on registered funding portals by rule or regulation for the "protection of investors and in the public interest." 98 Thus, even if the SEC's express authority only extends to "background and securities enforcement regulatory history check [s] ," the SEC's implied authority to "reduce the risk of fraud" could provide the SEC with authority to require funding portals to reject issuers who lack antifraud insurance.
99
One alternative would be for the SEC to require the registered funding portals rather than the issuers to obtain antifraud insurance, because Congress provided the SEC with the express authority to regulate the funding portals to reduce the risk of fraud. 102 Section 4A(c), however, does not address the liability of the funding portals, and the definition of issuer does not include funding portals. 103 One commentator has argued that the funding portals should not be liable for material misrepresentations or omissions in connection with crowdfunding offerings. 104 He argues that the SEC should promulgate rules to clarify whether additional disclosures provided by issuers through the funding portals would "impute liability" to the funding portals. 105 To address these concerns, the SEC could simply require the funding portals to disclose whether each crowdfunding issuer using the funding portal has the antifraud insurance, rather than require the funding portal itself to obtain the insurance or indemnify the issuers.
Congress further provides an express mandate in general to the SEC in Section 4(c) to "issue such rules as the [SEC] determines may be necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors." 106 In sum, although the SEC may not have the express authority to require issuers to obtain insurance, the SEC may have the implied authority to impose this requirement on issuers through the catchall provisions in Section 4(c) or Section 4A(b)(5). 107 The proposed insurance would only cover material misstatements or omissions within the meaning of Section 4A(c). 108 It would not reduce the risk of crowdfunding fraud ex ante, but it could mitigate the effects of the fraud on investors, particularly in cases in which an issuer has no remaining assets.
III. Applying Directors and Officers' Liability Insurance to the Crowdfunding Context
Under the proposed insurance, the SEC would require all crowdfunding issuers to obtain private insurance against securities liability under Section 4A(c) of the Securities Act, with the cost to be set by the marketplace. The insurance would follow the already-existing Directors and Officers' ("D&O") liability insurance purchased by registered public companies. The maximum recovery would be capped by the crowdfunding offering (up to $1 million). Any recovery under the insurance plan would require proof of a cause of action under Section 4A(c). This Part first addresses how the insurance could spread the costs of crowdfunding fraud before discussing the types of D&O insurance, fraud exclusion, moral hazard, securities settlements, and strike suits.
A. Spreading the Costs of Fraud through Crowdfunding Insurance
The proposed insurance would spread the costs of crowdfunding fraud across the issuers because the SEC would require each issuer to obtain at least $1 million in coverage before the issuer could participate in crowdfunding. The price of the insurance for each issuer would depend on the individual risk rating of the issuer and would reflect the "annualized present value of shareholder litigation risk" for that issuer. 109 Thus, even if not all issuers can obtain insurance at a reasonable price, this inability would be an early warning sign from the insurance companies that the issuer should review its disclosures for possible material misstatements or omissions.
The issuers would aggressively defend complaints because SEC enforcement actions could disqualify the issuers-including officers, directors, and major shareholders-from future crowdfunding or could cause insurance companies to raise premiums. 110 To reduce the costs of litigation, the SEC could set up an administrative proceeding for crowdfunding investors to file 109 Here, the proposed insurance first limits the maximum exposure because liability is capped at $1 million per offering (with a three-year statute of limitations). 123 Second, it limits repeat exposure because once an issuer violates Section 4A(c), the issuer could not crowdfund again, or the insurance company could raise premiums. Third, intent is not an element of the Section 4A(c) cause of action because an issuer could be held liable even if the issuer did not have the intent to make a material misrepresentation or omission, as with Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2), and unlike Rule 10b5. 124 Plaintiffs would not try to prove intent if it is not necessary to prevail under Section 4A(c), particularly if intent or deliberate fraud could reduce their recovery.
Even putting aside fraud exclusion, the proposed insurance would need to address the risk of moral hazard for directors and officers. 125 One factor that reduces moral hazard is the SEC's power to preclude from crowdfunding any person who has been subject to an SEC enforcement action. 126 Insurance companies should also deny insurance policies or raise premiums based on background checks of the issuers. The risk of moral hazard would also not be any different from that already existing for directors and officers of publicly traded companies with D&O insurance.
Another way to reduce moral hazard could be to retain joint and several liability for directors and officers. Joint and several liability would make each director and officer of the issuer individually liable for any bad acts of the issuer, even if a different director or officer committed the specific bad act in question. 127 Joint and several liability may require new statutory authority because Section 15 of the Securities Act provides express authority for joint and several liability of control persons under Sections 11 and 12, but not under Section 4A(c).
128
Although joint and several liability could lead to increased strike suits, the courts could achieve a balance by imposing cost-shifting or sanctions in appropriate cases as the next section illustrates.
D. Securities Settlements and Strike Suits
The proposed insurance would also need to account for settlements because nonfrivolous securities suits could still settle. An admission of liability in securities class actions settlements seems rare, but the D&O insurance still covers defense costs and indemnifies the directors and officers. 129 Here, the proposed insurance would still cover the defense costs to prove that the stock price may have dropped for reasons other than a material misrepresentation or omission.
The proposed insurance, however, should discourage meritless strike suits aimed at the antifraud insurance assets, which could drive up the costs of the insurance. In one recent study, Professor Tom Baker found that the "amount and structure of D&O insurance" significantly influences securities settlements based on his interviews with plaintiff and defense attorneys, D&O insurance claims managers, brokers, mediators, and testifying experts. 130 Because of the "virtual absence of adjudication," every securities class action that survives past the motions stage usually results in payment to the plaintiffs' class. 131 Even though parties may structure settlements by reference to other settlements, the lack of publicly available D&O insurance and settlement terms 132 pressures D&O insurers to settle on terms that may not reflect the merits of the claims at issue. 133 Similarly, the existence of crowdfunding insurance could lead to increased filings of strike suits. 134 In these strike suits, "[o]pportunistic plaintiffs' attorneys continuously monitor securities prices, probing for recent offerings that perform poorly in the aftermarket." 135 One way to discourage strike suits could be partial or complete cost-shifting. Costshifting could make it expensive for plaintiffs' attorneys who file frivolous suits because they could be responsible for the defense costs for the suits. Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys would need to do proper research before automatically filing suit after every instance of crowdfunding loss.
Another way to discourage strike suits could be to require judges to impose sanctions for frivolous suits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 136 This issue previously arose in securities class action litigation, which led to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). 137 PSLRA was a response to plaintiffs' firms filing frivolous securities strike suits, and the defendants' tendency to settle the suits to avoid the high costs of litigation. 138 Prior to PSLRA, courts seldom exercised their discretion to sanction plaintiffs who filed frivolous complaints, but after PSLRA, Congress mandated that courts make specific findings concerning the requirements of Rule 11 and impose sanctions on attorneys who do not meet Rule 11. 139 In sum, the proposed D&O liability insurance model would spread the costs of fraud in crowdfunding across issuers because each issuer would obtain at least $1 million in insurance.
Issuers unable to obtain insurance would not be permitted to crowdfund. To reduce litigation costs, the SEC could establish an administrative proceeding to resolve complaints before an ALJ.
To reduce moral hazard, the insurance could exclude deliberate fraud, but it would include material misrepresentations or omissions within the meaning of Section 4A(c). 140 To reduce the risk of strike suits, the courts could impose cost-shifting or sanctions in appropriate cases.
Conclusion
The SEC should require crowdfunding issuers to obtain private insurance against liability under Section 4A(c) of the Securities Act, based on D&O liability insurance. Antifraud concerns could be a major reason for SEC holdup on rulemaking because the SEC must balance investor protection against the costs of disclosure. 141 To address these concerns, a private insurance model could spread the costs of fraud in crowdfunding across the issuers. The maximum recovery would be capped by the amount of the crowdfunding offering, and any recovery under the proposed insurance plan would require proof of a cause of action under Section 4A(c).
